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 Abstract 
 
An impure public good is a commodity  that combines public and private characteristics 
in fixed proportions. Green goods such as dolphin-friendly tuna or green electricity 
programs provide increasings popular examples of impure goods. We design an 
experiment to test how the presence of impure public goods affects pro-social behaviour. 
We set parameters, such that from a theoretical point of view the presence of the impure 
public good is behaviorally irrelevant. In a baseline setting, where the impure public good 
provides only small contributions to the public good. We observe that on aggregate pro-
social behaviour, defined as total contributions to the public good, is lower in the 
presence of the impure good. Some individuals do not alter their decisions, but roughly 
two fifths of subjects make a lower contribution to the public good in the presence of the 
impure public good. On the contrary, in the case where the impure public good favours 
the public good component at the expense of private earnings, individuals are unaffected 
in their behaviour. We conclude that the presence of green goods which have only a small 
environmental component may reduce pro-environmental behaviour.  
 
Keywords: green goods, impure public goods, pro-social behaviour, social norms, 
experimental economics. 
JEL codes: C91, D64, H41, Q59 
3 
1. INTRODUCTION 
So-called green goods involve the joint provision of a private good and an environmental 
public good and are in fact a specific type of impure public good (Cornes and Sandler, 
1994). In market based societies, many green goods are now sold as alternatives to 
conventional consumer goods in markets as diverse as domestic electricity, investment 
funds, office stationery and cars. More widely, green goods belong to the class of 
embedded goods that include an ethical dimension, such as Fair Trade products as well as 
RED branded goods from Apple, Gap and others. For parsimony we will refer to them all 
as impure goods. In this paper, we report on two linked experiments designed to test the 
impact on choices of the presence of an impure good. We seek to examine whether 
having an impure good available in the choice set raises total contributions to a public 
good. 
The public good characteristic of impure goods may be intrinsic to the production or 
distribution of the private good or it may be simply embedded in the private good, such 
as a donation to a public good cause. The case of the intrinsic public good characteristic 
encompasses goods whose production or distribution process is less environmentally 
damaging as is the case of  green electricity (which is produced with renewable energy 
sources, thus reducing greenhouse-gas emissions), shade-grown coffee (whose 
production preserves the natural habitat and biodiversity), recycled stationery (which 
saves raw resources), dolphin-safe tuna (whose capture process minimizes collateral 
species damage), hybrid cars (which generate less greenhouse-gas emissions than 
conventional cars), organic produce (whose production process is claimed to be less 
environmentally damaging than conventional farming), amongst others. Meanwhile 
embedded giving can be found in for example charity postcards (which allocate a fixed 
value of the sales price to the charity), and carbon neutral flights (whose price includes 
the corresponding carbon offset payment). In effect, as long as a private good is bundled 
with a type of environmental offset or contribution to reduce environmental externalities, 
it can be considered an impure good. 
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Not only have markets for green and ethical goods emerged recently but there is also 
increased demand for these goods. Furthermore, green goods and eco-labels are 
considered as instruments in an information disclosure approach to environmental policy 
advocated for example by the OECD (2001)2. Therefore the relevance of impure goods in 
all forms is undeniable.  
Apart from the growing importance of impure goods commercially, our motives for 
conducting the experiment stems from the fact that there at least two main theoretical 
perspectives on their impact. A straightforward view is that impure goods simply add to 
the choices open to the consumer (Kotchen, 2005, 2006). One can think of the standard 
good as being one characteristic and the environmental cause as another characteristic. A 
green good like a carbon neutral flight then bundles the standard good and the 
environmental cause of lower carbon emissions into one package. A green good might 
also lower search costs or reap some economies of scope in production. Alternatively, it 
might be difficult to combine the characteristics in the same good. Thus in theory the 
impure good could offer consumption that was more or less efficient than simply 
purchasing the two goods separately. 
The alternative perspective is founded more in social psychology, allied with some 
evidence from recent economics experiments. This view suggests that human behaviour 
is more contextual and wilier. Kunda (1990) suggests that individuals use a set of 
cognitive processes that allows them to arrive at the conclusion they want. This direction-
based reasoning is limited by the justifiability of the reasoning, that is, “people motivated 
to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and construct a justification of 
                                                 
2 Informational approaches to environmental policy have been called the “third wave” of policy control 
policies, as opposed to the first wave of regulatory instruments and the second wave of economic 
instruments. Tietenberg (1998) considers that «disclosure strategies seek to enlist market forces in 
the quest for efficient pollution control» (p. 588). 
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their desired conclusion that could persuade a dispassionate observer” (Kunda, 1990, p. 
482). This phenomenon of motivated reasoning allows individuals to justify their actions 
and act in the contrary direction prescribed by the norm. In the context of public good 
contributions, individuals may acknowledge a norm for altruistic behaviour. However the 
presence of the impure good may guide individuals towards high or low contributions 
depending on the technology parameters. In this sense, an impure good with a low share 
of the public component creates a justification for acting less altruistically than in its 
absence. 
Motivated reasoning is a fairly neutral term. Other social psychologists have used the 
more loaded expression moral hypocrisy to refer to the case where “morality is extolled – 
even enacted – not with an eye to producing a good and right outcome but in order to 
appear moral yet still benefit oneself” (Batson et al., 1997). This phenomenon has been 
extensively documented with experiments where subjects try to give the appearance of 
acting morally following a pro-social norm, when in reality they are acting selfishly 
(Batson et al., 1997, Batson, 2002).  
Some economic experiments have provided evidence of motivated reasoning effects and 
apparent moral hypocrisy. Both Lazear, Malmendier et al., 2005 and Dana et al., 2006 ran 
dictator games in which subjects had the option not to play the dictator game and keep 
the endowment to themselves without and with a penalty, respectively. In these 
experiments, dictators make their choice before being informed that they can opt out of 
the game and keep the endowment or part of it, and 41% and 27.8% of participants, 
respectively, who had indicated they would have shared something with the recipient, 
then choose to opt out of the game. Therefore, in both cases some subjects who would 
have shared something in a straightforward dictator game, prefer not to play the game at 
all, avoiding thus being in a position where some sort of altruistic norm would compel 
them to give to the recipient.  
Another source of motivated reasoning occurs in the presence of what Dana, Weber and 
Kuang (2006, 2007) have called a moral wriggle room. A wriggle room is present when 
some element in the decision allows individuals to justify acting selfishly, which implies 
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that if the wriggle room was not present, individuals would act more altruistically. The 
wriggle room effect will therefore correspond to a selfish behaviour when the wriggle 
room is present and an altruistic choice otherwise. Several wriggle room catalysts have 
been identified, namely uncertainty about outcomes and delegation of responsibility, etc.  
In practice with some actual products, the claims of an impure good are not always 
backed by concrete information concerning the actual contribution to the public good 
cause (as in the case where a percentage of the profits is said to be given to particular 
cause without further information3 4). In other cases, with goods such as hybrid cars 
which are less environmentally damaging, the consumer needs to seek specialized 
information to fully understand her contribution to the environmental public good. For 
example some Christmas cards are marketed as contributing some amount to a selected 
registered charity. These are often more expensive than equivalent conventional 
Christmas cards and the charitable differential may be less than the markup in price5. 
Hence, a more efficient solution would be to purchase a cheaper option and donate the 
remaining to charity, often without much effort (given the intensive donation campaigns 
at that time of year). However, though they are often an inefficient option, charity cards 
are increasingly popular among card purchasers. Despite the often blurry definition of the 
public good component and the inefficiency in the implicit technology by which the 
bundling is achieved, impure goods are increasingly chosen in settings where it is also 
possible to make direct contributions to public good causes. Therefore, there are some 
                                                 
3 For example, two Red products have the following indications in terms of the public good component 
(source: http://joinred.com/products/) with no clear monetary quantification: «Giorgio Armani is 
contributing an average of 40 percent of its gross profit margin from sales of all Emporio Armani 
(PRODUCT) RED Products directly to the Global Fund.» and «5-15% (depending on the product 
sold) of the net sales of Converse (PRODUCT) RED shoes will be contributed to the Global Fund, 
to help eliminate AIDS in Africa.» 
4 The New York Times in December 2007 ran both an editorial and an article on how some embedded 
giving programmes lacked transparency (NYT, 2007b, NYT, 2007a).  
5 In the UK, the Charities Advisory Board (2007) publishes a list of charity Christmas cards and the 
respective contribution to the designated charity and alerts to the variability in charity contributions 
by retailer and to the small amounts being donated in reality. 
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reasons to suspect that an impure good may be chosen because it provides an easy moral 
escape route from a social norm prescribing generosity towards public goods. 
Given these considerations, we wish to explore the issue of behavioural relevance of 
these impure goods for the private provision of public goods. The plan for the remainder 
of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical analysis of impure 
public goods, and our design. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the results. Conclusions 
from both experiments are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2. IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS AND THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC 
GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1.  Pro-social preferences and behaviours in theory and experiments 
In the Economics literature on pro-social behaviours, several types of preferences have 
been identified that may give rise to the private provision of public goods. Generically an 
altruistic motivation exists when an individual’s utility includes the level of public goods. 
Another such motivation subjacent to the contribution to a public good is the warm glow 
hypothesis of Andreoni (1990), according to which some individuals derive utility from 
the contribution to the public good in itself rather than the public good, thus experiencing 
a “warm-glow” from giving. Alternatively, Hollander (1990) considers that individuals 
care about what is the social standard of contribution by others and derive utility from 
how they compare to this standard. This has been denoted as the social approval 
motivation hypothesis. Furthermore, Nyborg (2003) considers that individuals care about 
their own perception of their pro-social behaviour relative to others, which is a self-image 
assumption concerning preferences. However, regardless of how we interpret pro-social 
behaviour in terms of underlying motivation, in these types of preferences individuals 
derive utility from the private and public characteristics and not from the means by which 
these characteristics are achieved.  
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Assuming consumers have preferences towards public goods, the choice problem of the 
pro-socially motivated consumer involves allocating income between private and public 
goods. Impure goods combine both a private and a public dimension with a fixed 
technology, therefore they represent an additional option for the consumer’s choice 
problem. Within this setting the consumer engages in the private provision of public 
goods when she chooses to purchase either the pure public good or the impure good. 
In terms of the Experimental Economics literature, pro-social behaviours have been 
systematically observed in experiments with games such as the dictator game. In dictator 
games, one subject (the dictator) is endowed with money and instructed to make a 
decision as to its division between himself and another participant (the recipient). The 
subject is thus faced with a choice problem involving her payoffs and the payoffs of 
another participant. A robust generic result has been for some dictators to allocate a 
positive share of endowment to recipients, despite that fact that a payoff-maximizing 
individual should keep the endowment. However if we assume the individual cares about 
the payoff of the other participant, then sharing a part of the endowment may be utility 
maximizing, and regardless of the motivation prompting individuals to share with the 
recipient, the fact is that these types of behaviours are observed robustly in dictator game 
experiments (Camerer, 2003). The dictator game involves no interaction between subjects 
and is normally a one-shot choice, so there are no confounding issues arising from 
strategic behaviour, reputation building, cooperation, etc.  
To study the behavioural reaction of individuals to the presence of impure goods, we can 
take a choice setting, such as a dictator game and replace the other subject by a charity, 
and in this case the subject is asked to allocate the endowment between herself and a 
public good cause. In this choice setting, we can introduce a generic impure good, and 
thus study in a controlled environment whether or not individual choices are affected by 
the presence of the impure good.  
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2.2. Strategic framework 
Our basic design starts with the theoretical work of Kotchen (2005, 2006) who models 
green goods as impure goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1984, Cornes and Sandler, 1994) and 
uses a broad definition of green good to include both cases discussed above, namely the 
intrinsic and embedded public characteristic. Kotchen proposes that consumer behaviour 
and the private provision of public goods in markets with impure goods be analyzed 
within a characteristics approach. Specifically, preferences are based on the consumption 
of private and the public characteristic regardless of how they are achieved (through pure 
private, pure public or impure goods). For want of a better term, we will call this the 
standard view. 
The budget constraint faced by the consumer is represented by a combination of private 
characteristics iX  and public characteristics Y, which can be obtained via a conventional 
good (
i
c ) generating one unit of X and costing 1 monetary unit, a direct donation to the 
public good (
i
d ) generating one unit of Y and costing 1 monetary unit, or via the impure 
good (
i
g ). The impure good generates both characteristics 
i i
X gα=  and 
i i
Y gβ=  with 
positive technology parameters6 ( 0, 0α β> > ) and costs 1. The prices of the characteristics 
are mainly a function of technology parameters, when obtained via the impure good. An 
impure good, whose joint production of the characteristics is more efficient than the 
separate production, i.e. 1α β+ > , will be denoted as efficient, as opposed to the case 
where 1α β+ <  and 1α β+ = , which will be called inefficient and neutral impure good 
respectively.  
The budget constraint faced by a consumer i in the presence of an efficient impure good 
with exogenous wealth of wi is defined in terms of the characteristics by equations (1.1) 
and illustrated by Figure 1. 
                                                 
6 Kotchen ({Kotchen 2005 #1189 /d}) suggests that the technology parameter related to the public good 
characteristic can be interpreted as an awareness parameter related to how consumers perceive this 
component of the impure public good. 
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Figure 1 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with efficient impure good (E) 
In the presence of the efficient impure good, the set of possible characteristics bundles is 
expanded in comparison with just the combination of ci and di. Point M corresponds to 
the case where individuals allocate all their income to the consumption of Xi through the 
consumption of conventional private good ci. To increase the consumption of Yi, without 
the impure good, individuals trade-off one for one consumption of ci for di. With the 
impure good, they can increase consumption of Yi, by reducing ci  and increasing gi, thus 
moving up segment EM. This occurs up to the limit where all income is being allocated 
to the impure good yielding βwi of Yi and αwi of Xi. B corresponds to the case where 
individuals allocate all income to the public good thus generating Yi=wi. To increase 
consumption of Xi individuals can move down segment BE, decreasing donation and 
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increasing consumption of the impure good, up to bundle E. So, an impure good whose 
production technology is efficient expands the individual consumption possibilities set. 
Given these budget constraints (in equations (1.1)) and assuming that individuals’ 
preferences are defined only on the characteristics space, the individual utility 
maximization problem over the characteristics is as follows: 
 
( )
( )
,
,
. .  
1
1
       
i i
i i i
X Y
i i i
i i i
maxU X Y
s t Y w X
Y w X
β
α
β
α
≤ −
−
−
≤ −
 (1.2) 
For the case when the impure good is neutral in terms of its technology ( 1α β+ = ), the 
same bundle of characteristics is obtainable with a combination of private and public 
goods. In Figure 2, the consumption set is given by segment BM only. The introduction 
of this impure good is neutral as far as the consumer optimization problem is concerned, 
since individual preferences are only defined on the characteristics. If an impure good is 
inefficient and has a technology such that 1α β+ < , it would be possible to spend the 
same amount of income on a combination of the conventional private and public goods 
and obtain higher amounts of at least one characteristic. This is illustrated by Figure 
3Error! Reference source not found.. When the impure goods are either neutral or 
inefficient, the consumer utility maximization problem implies that the choice of the 
impure good is always weakly or strongly dominated, since the consumer will always 
prefer more of each characteristic rather than less. In both cases, when consumer’s 
preferences are defined in terms of private and public characteristics, the introduction of 
an impure good should not alter the allocation to the consumption of private and public 
characteristics. 
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Figure 2 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with neutral impure good 
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Figure 3 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with inefficient impure good 
In summary, when we assume that individuals’ preferences are defined in terms of 
private and public characteristics, the introduction of an inefficient or neutral impure 
good does not affect individual’s utility maximization problem and therefore does not 
affect her utility maximizing choices. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether 
this theoretical prediction holds experimentally; in other words, we should still find 
experimentally that as long as the impure good is not efficient it should be behaviourally 
irrelevant. 
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2.3. Impure Goods in a laboratory experiment 
So, from a standard point of view, the introduction of an impure good is just another way 
of supplying private and public characteristics. If the impure good is efficient, it will 
expand the consumption possibilities. However if this impure good is neutral or 
inefficient it does not alter the consumption set and therefore the ultimate utility 
maximizing choices. Therefore our main hypothesis is: 
H0: The presence of an inefficient or neutral impure good is not behaviourally relevant. 
A corollary is that the impure good should not be chosen when it is inefficient. 
To test this hypothesis we use a modified dictator game as the starting point. In the 
typical dictator game, the recipient is another individual, usually another player in the 
experiment. We use a good cause as the recipient (see for example Eckel and Grossman 
(1996) who use a local branch of the American Red Cross as a recipient). In the baseline 
decision, individuals can keep the endowment for private purposes or make contributions 
to public good causes. In the treatment decisions, the impure good is an option with a 
predefined division of the payoffs between the individual and the charity. When an 
impure good is present we will refer to this modified game as an impure good dictator 
game. 
Subjects are asked to allocate a given endowment of 10 tokens between themselves and a 
charity, which is described before the start of the experiment. For this experiment, the 
charity is the Hardship Fund at Royal Holloway – University of London, UK (RHUL) 
which assists students financially. We choose this charity to make it relevant to the 
participants in the experiment, since for the charitable component of the experiment to be 
salient, subjects should care about it and being students at RHUL, we expect them to feel 
more strongly towards this charity than another broader charity. Therefore their earnings 
from this experiment correspond to a private consumption decision and their donation to 
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the charity corresponds to their private provision of the public good (in this case, the 
welfare of fellow students at RHUL). 
 
2.4. Design 
Given a fixed endowment, the underlying budget set can be described by four parameters: 
1. The presence or absence of the impure public good. 
2. The value of α+β – i.e. whether the impure public good is neutral, efficient or 
inefficient. 
3. The value of β/α – i.e. whether the impure public good has relatively more or less 
of the public good. 
4. The price, p, of the public good, relative to the private good.  
In the experiment we vary the values of these parameters to consider the robustness of the 
main hypothesis and to investigate subsidiary theories. We two values of p: when the 
price of making a donation is high, one token kept corresponds to £0.50 in individual 
earnings and one token allocated to the charity corresponds to a donation of £1; when the 
price of making a donation is low, one token kept still corresponds to £0.5, but now £2 
goes to the charity for each token donated to it. We use two types of β/α. For simplicity 
we will label impure public goods with the relatively high value of β/α as altruistic and 
ones with a relatively low value of β/α as selfish. Obviously these labels are purely 
relative. Finally, this experiment concerns only impure goods where the technology 
parameters are such that they are not efficient (α+β≤1). 
For the baseline decision (labeled 1H), we use the high price. The budget frontier is 
illustrated in Figure 4 (a). The range of potential private earnings is [£0, £5] for the 
individual and [£0, £10] for the charity. 
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In the treatment decision (Decision 2H), individuals have not only the option to make an 
allocation of 10 tokens as described above, but also the option to choose a predefined 
allocation, corresponding to an inefficient and selfish impure good. The inefficient 
impure good implies earnings of £4.25 for the individual and £0.50 for the charity, 
corresponding to 8.5 tokens and 0.5 tokens respectively (illustrated in Figure 4 (b)).  
In a variant of the treatment decision, the selfish impure good is neutral in its 
characteristics combination (Decision 3H). This impure good implies private earnings of 
£4 and donation of £2. The choice set is illustrated in Figure 4 (c). 
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(c) Decision with neutral impure good  
(Decision 3H) 
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Figure 4 Choice set in baseline decision and decisions with selfish impure goods with high price of giving 
 
Other decisions can be depicted in a similar manner, as in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 Choice set in baseline decision and decision with inefficient impure good with low price of giving 
 
Subjects are also told they will have to make several decisions but only one will count 
towards their actual payoff and charity donations, which will be determined by random 
draw at the end. This procedure follows the random-selection method (Davis and Holt, 
1993, p. 438) with neither feedback between decisions nor feedback in terms of what 
other participants have chosen. As such, subjects have an incentive to treat each decision 
independently, and are reminded more than once that they should treat each decision as if 
it were the one that will determine their actual payoff. 
 
3. EXPERIMENT 1: SELFISH IMPURE GOOD 
3.1. Implementation 
Subjects were recruited at RHUL by campus and intranet advertisements and via the 
mailing list for recruitment to economic experiments. The sessions took place in the 
Experimental Economics Laboratory using Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) during the month 
of October 2007. Subjects were seated at computer terminals and informed that their 
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decisions and earnings would remain anonymous and private. In this experiment, 66 
students took part, of which 23 were female (35%) and the average age was 20.9 years.  
To familiarize subjects with the computer interface and ultimately the allocation 
calculations that are later required of them, individuals are asked to read through a 
hypothetical scenario where allocation decisions are made and asked to make 
calculations. There is however a clear indication that this is not the actual experimental 
scenario. In case a participant makes a mistake, she has to wait for the experimenter to 
discuss the error privately before she can proceed to the actual experiment. Of the 66 
participants who took part in the experiment reported here, 9 required intervention by the 
experimenter. However, there were no significant differences in the distribution of 
behaviour in any decision between subjects who made a mistake in the practice and those 
who did not.  
For a session that never exceeded one hour, average earnings were £8.14, with a 
minimum earned of £5.40 and a maximum of £9, which include a show-up fee of £4. 
This is comfortably above the minimum hourly wage for the UK. 
 
3.2. Results 
Order effects 
We implement two treatments, each with 12 decisions, which differ in the order with 
which the baseline decision (Decision 1H) and the decision with impure good (Decision 
2H) are implemented as well as in the order of other decisions. In order treatment 1, the 
first decision is the baseline decision (with high cost of giving) followed by the decision 
with an impure good (with high cost of giving), and the reverse is implemented in order 
treatment 2. Respectively, 29 and 37 subjects participate in each order treatment. The 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test (WMW test) yields no statistically significant 
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differences in donations in the baseline decision in both treatments (test statistic of z=-
0.669 and 2-tailed p-value = 0.504). Meanwhile, the difference in charitable behaviour in 
the presence of the impure good in both order treatments is not statistically significant, 
following the WMW test (z=0.013, 2-sided p=0.985). Similarly there are no order 
treatment differences for the other decisions made by subjects in this experiment. Hence, 
the data for each decision is pooled for the following analyses. 
 
Behaviour in the baseline decision  
In our experiment, in the baseline decision with high price of giving (Decision 1H), 77% 
of subjects donate a positive amount to charity, as can be seen in Figure 6. On average 
the amount donated is £2.42 which corresponds to 24.2% of the maximum donation 
possible (Table 1 summarizes the donations for this decision and for the decisions that 
will be discussed later). Also, considering only the donors, the average donation is 31.3% 
of the maximum allowed. 
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Figure 6 Frequency of donations in Decision 1H 
Table 1 Donations in Experiment 1: descriptive statistics 
Mean
Standard 
deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Baseline Decision Decision 1H 2.42 2.33 2 0 10
Decision with inefficient selfish impure good Decision 2H 1.67 1.86 1 0 9
Decision with neutral selfish impure good Decision 3H 1.89 1.56 2 0 10
Baseline Decision Decision 1L 5.30 5.78 4 0 20
Decision with inefficient selfish impure good Decision 2L 2.77 3.99 2 0 20
Note: 66 observations
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The results are in line with previous work. Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2005) 
observe in their baseline treatment (with anonymity) that 67% of the 46 participants share 
something with the recipient of the $10 with which they are endowed; on average 
subjects share 24.2% of the endowment and considering only the individuals who share 
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something, the average shared is 37.1%. Meanwhile, Eckel and Grossman (1996) observe 
that 73% of subjects donate to the charity.  
 
Behaviour in the presence of a selfish and inefficient impure good 
In Decision 2H, the impure good gives an earning of £4.25 to the individual and £0.50 to 
the charity. In this decision the impure good can be classified as both selfish, since the 
implicit token allocation favours the individual, and inefficient, since it generates a loss 
of 1 token, or equivalently £0.50 in private earnings or £1 in donation 
The null hypothesis is that the impure good is not behaviourally relevant. However, 
comparing individual charitable behaviour in the presence and absence of the impure 
good, we reject this hypothesis. In the baseline decision, 1H, mean donations are £2.42; 
in decision 2H, in the presence of the selfish and inefficient impure good the mean 
donation is £1.67 (refer to Table 1 and Figure 7 for the frequency of donations). The 
mean donation is lower because 42.5% of subjects (28) donate less to the charity in the 
presence of the impure good, whereas only 21% (14) increase their contribution. 
Comparing donation choices in Decision 1H and 2H, we conclude that this behavioural 
difference is statistically significant (z=2.65, p<0.01) 8.  
                                                 
8 Unless otherwise stated, the reported p-values for the statistical tests are 1-tailed p-values and the reported 
test results are for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (W test). 
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Figure 7 Frequency of donations in Decision 2H 
We also observe that the impure good is chosen by 9 out of 66 subjects (13.6%) in 
Decision 2H. This behaviour is not consistent with assuming that individuals care only 
about the private or public characteristics. A closer inspection of the individuals who 
choose the impure good reveals that 7/9 give a higher donation in the baseline decision.  
If we restrict attention to the individuals who do not choose the impure good (57 
subjects), the mean donation is £2.29 in Decision 1H and £1.85 in Decision 2H. For this 
subsample, the charitable behaviour is significantly higher in Decision 1H than in 
Decision 2H following the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (z=1.747, p=0.04). 
In other words donations are typically lower in the presence of the impure good. 
 
With a low price of giving we get the same difference between tasks. A breakdown of the 
frequency of donations is presented in Figure 9. Decision 1L is the same as the baseline 
decision but with a low price of donating. In Decision 1L the 66 participants donate on 
average 2.65 tokens, corresponding to £5.30, and specifically 53 (80%) are donors 
(Figure 8), donating 3.30 tokens or equivalently £6.60.  Similarly decision 2L is the same 
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as 2H but for the lower price of giving. Again donations are lower in the presence of the 
impure good. The mean donation is only £2.77 in 2L. Median behaviour is significantly 
higher in Decision 1L than in Decision 2L (z=4.37, z<0.01). Meanwhile in 2L, the 
impure good is chosen by 22.7% (15/66) subjects.  Considering only the 51 individuals 
who do not choose the impure good in Decision 2L, the same behavioural effect from the 
presence of the impure good is observed relative to Decision 1L. The mean donation is 
lower (£4.66 to £3.29) and the behavioural difference between median decisions is 
statistically significant (z=3.093, p<0.01). 
 
As an aside we can examine the effect of lowering the price of donations by comparing 
behaviour in 1L and 1H. In terms of tokens donated there are no statistically significant 
differences in individual decisions (z=-0.143, 2–tailed p=0.88), whereas, as a 
consequence, the difference in monetary donations is statistically significant between 
decisions (z = -4.232 and p<0.01). Therefore, subjects do not change their own earnings 
as a consequence of the decrease in the price of giving, however they are able to become 
more generous without sacrificing any personal gain. These results are in line with the 
findings of Karlan and List (2007) who find that an increase in matching has no 
significant effect on the amount directly donated (before matching) by individuals.  
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Figure 8 Frequency of donations in Decision 1L 
To sum up, both the hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of the inefficient impure good 
and the corollary of no-choice of inefficient impure goods are rejected. Not only do some 
subjects choose the inefficient impure good and decrease their donation as a 
consequence, but the ones who make an explicit allocation, give a lower average 
contribution to the charity in the impure good dictator game. 
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Figure 9 Frequency of donations in Decision 2L 
 
3.3. Selfish and neutral impure good 
We include in the tasks a variation on Decision 2H, which consists of making the impure 
good neutral instead of inefficient (Decision 3H). Again the standard theoretical 
prediction for individuals who care only about the private and public characteristics is for 
their charitable behaviour not to be influenced by the presence of the neutral impure 
good. In terms of implementation, this decision consists of the choice set representation 
in Figure 4 (c), where the impure good has a payoff of £4 for the individual and £2 for 
charity, which is equivalent to 8 tokens kept and 2 donated.  
In this decision, the mean donation is £1.89 as opposed to £2.42 in the baseline decision 
(Decision 1H). Comparing these two decisions, charitable behaviour in the baseline is 
higher with weak statistical significance (z=1.607, p=0.054), which again corroborates 
the finding of behavioural relevance of a non-efficient impure good. Also, 26 out of the 
66 participants (39.4%) choose the neutral impure good, but for these individuals we 
observe no significant behavioural change relative to the baseline decision (z=0.89, 2-
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tailed p=0.372). On the contrary, the subjects who make the allocation in Decision 3H 
decrease their mean donation from £2.3 in the baseline to £1.82 and the median donation 
pattern is weakly significantly higher in the baseline relative to Decision 3H (z=1.402, 
p=0.08). Furthermore, whereas the inefficient impure good is only chosen by 13.6% 
(9/66) of subjects, the neutral good is picked by 39.4% (26/66), even though out of these 
26 subjects, only 6 donate the same £2 in Decision 1H that they are implicitly donating in 
Decision 3H through the impure good. 
Given that we observe the same type of donation decrease in the presence of either an 
inefficient or a neutral selfish impure good, it is interesting to further investigate if there 
is any further change in generosity when the good is neutral relative to when it is 
inefficient. For this purpose we can compare behaviour in Decision 3H involving a 
neutral impure good and Decision 2H involving an inefficient impure good. Charitable 
behaviour in the presence of the former is weakly significantly higher than in the 
presence of the latter (z=1.5, p=0.065). It can be the case that overall subjects become 
more generous towards the charity or that the inefficiency is in fact being passed on to the 
charity. In fact we observe that whereas donations are lower relative to the baseline, 
private payoffs are similar to the baseline (z=0.99, 2-tailed p=0.321), so the slight 
increase in donations comes from the fact that the impure good is no longer inefficient. 
Also, the result is mostly driven by the behaviour of the individuals who choose the 
neutral impure good, since the remaining 40 subjects do not significantly alter their 
donations between Decision 2H and 3H (z=0.332, 2-tailed p=0.7395), but decrease them 
relative to Decision 1H (z=-1.402, p=0.08). Therefore even though we observe an overall 
increase in donations when the impure good loses its inefficiency, this is not driven by a 
behavioural change by those who are making the active allocations but by the fact that 
the good is neutral. 
In summary, relative to the baseline decision, the introduction of the neutral selfish 
impure good decreases charitable behaviour, mostly because subjects not choosing the 
impure good decrease their donation. On the contrary, those individuals who pick the 
neutral impure good remain on aggregate consistent in their donation behaviour relative 
to the baseline. Also, when the impure good is neutral donation behaviour is slightly 
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higher than when it is inefficient, since the inefficiency in the impure good is being brunt 
by the charity. 
 
3.4. Anchoring or experimenter demand 
This experiment extends the dictator game to include the option of a transparent impure 
good. Even though, we would expect selfish impure goods, either neutral or inefficient to 
be behaviourally irrelevant, we have rejected both the behavioural irrelevance hypothesis 
and its corollary of no-choice of the inefficient impure good.  
One possible explanation for this behavioural relevance of the impure good may be due 
to a cognitive process of anchoring and/or experimenter demand.9 Anchoring refers to a 
non-intentional phenomenon by which final choices and judgment are dependent on the 
initial anchor value as well as to the process of adjustment that takes place in between 
(Kahneman et al., 1986).  Since the impure good in this experimental setting provides a 
defined allocation of tokens and earnings, this may provide some anchoring bias in the 
individual decisions in the presence of the impure good, especially given the consecutive 
nature of the decisions, even if within a random lottery of decisions for payoff 
determination. Alternatively, decisions may be driven by experimenter demand, whereby 
subjects try to comply with what they see as the wishes of the experimenter.  
Since anchoring is typically defined as a non-motivated phenomenon, if it is present it 
should occur in an experiment setting such as this one regardless of the nature of the 
impure good. We therefore run a second experiment with an altruistic impure good, 
designed to test the following null hypothesis: 
                                                 
9 The wider significance of our results would differ between these explanations. If impure goods caused an 
anchoring effect, their presence could lower or raise pro-social behaviour depending on the value of 
the anchor. If on the other hand are results were driven by experimenter demand then they would 
have no obvious policy implications.  
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H0:  The presence of an inefficient or neutral impure good is not behaviourally relevant 
when the impure good is altruistic. 
If we reject this null, then anchoring or experimenter demand appears to be a likely 
explanation of our results. Alternatively, if we accept the null then we reject anchoring 
and experimenter demand explanations of behaviour in Experiment 1.  
 
4. EXPERIMENT 2: ALTRUISTIC IMPURE GOOD 
4.1. Design 
This experiment is similar to Experiment 1, except for the fact that in the treatment 
decision, the impure good favours the charity rather than the individual. From the 
standard theoretical point of view the null hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of the 
inefficient impure good should hold. Individuals are faced with 9 decisions and informed 
that only one of these decisions will be randomly picked at the end to determine their 
payoff from the experiment. The focus of this experiment is to study the effect of an 
altruistic impure good in a similar setting to Experiment 1. Therefore the first two 
decisions correspond to the baseline decision and the treatment decision. 
In the baseline decision, participants can allocate 10 tokens between themselves and the 
charity. The price of donating is low, which means that every 1 token the individual 
donates, corresponds to £2. Since each token is worth £0.50 in private earnings, this low 
price of giving is equivalent to a matching ratio of £1: £3. The choice set in this decision 
is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 10. The treatment impure good is altruistic because it 
favours the charity in terms of the allocation (Decision 4L). In this case the individual 
earns £2 and the charity receives £11, which corresponds to 4 tokens kept and 5.5 
donated, so this impure good is inefficient. 
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Figure 10 Choice set in baseline decision and decision with altruistic impure good with low price of giving 
 
4.2. Results 
Subjects were again recruited at Royal Holloway – University of London during 
December 2007. In this experiment, 33 individuals participated, of which 16 were female 
(48%) and the average age was 21.3 years. In the baseline decision, 78.7% of subjects 
donate a positive amount to charity (28/33), and the mean donation is £4.90 for the whole 
sample and £6.23 for donors only. The donation choices are illustrated in Figure 11 and 
descriptive statistics are in Table 2. 
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Figure 11 Frequency of donations in baseline decision in Experiment 2 
 
Table 2 Donations in Experiment 2: descriptive statistics 
Mean
Standard 
deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Baseline Decision Decision 1L 4.90 5.07 4 0 20
Decision with inefficient altruistic impure good Decision 4L 5.54 5.67 4 0 20
Note: 33 observations
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In the presence of the impure good (decision 4L), the mean donation is £5.54 and 72.7% 
of subjects donate something to charity (24/33). The impure good is chosen by 5 out of 
the 33 participants (15.2%). Experiment 1 established that participants decreased their 
donations in the presence of the selfish impure good. But for these two decisions in 
Experiment 2, there is no statistically significant behavioural difference (z=-0.981, 2-
tailed p-value=0.326).  
Therefore, the hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of an altruistic and inefficient 
impure good is not rejected. As such, if the results in Experiment 1 had been driven by 
either anchoring or experimenter demand we would expect a similar influence of this 
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more altruistic impure good, generating more generous behaviours. However, as 
observed the altruistic cue is ignored by subjects. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
From a standard point of view the presence of an impure good that is not efficient should 
not affect individual charitable behaviour. Our experiments introduce inefficient and 
neutral impure goods in a choice setting and test the behavioural irrelevance hypothesis 
in a laboratory environment.  
Experiment 1 introduced an impure good that favoured the individual in terms of 
earnings. As shown, the presence of the selfish impure good decreases individual 
charitable behaviour (Decision 2H). On the one hand, individuals who were donating 
more money to charity decrease their donation; specifically 31.8% (21/66) of participants 
make active allocations that imply a lower donation in the presence of the impure good. 
On the other hand, we saw that 13.6% (9/66) of subjects opt for the impure good despite 
its inefficiency and thereby 7 are in fact being less generous than before. These 
individuals who choose the impure good are in a sense opting out of the dictator game 
before them and taking a convenient solution, for which they are willing to sacrifice some 
donations. Given that the impure good is inefficient, while many subjects were 
influenced, most did not choose it, which does not mean, as we showed, that they were 
not impacted by the presence of the impure good. 
Maintaining the inefficiency of the impure good, Experiment 2 tests the behavioural 
irrelevance hypothesis but with an impure good that favours the charity. In this case, the 
impure good did not generate statistically significant behavioural changes. Therefore 
what we observe in Experiment 1 does not seem to be the result of experimenter demand 
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or, a mostly unconscious phenomenon such as anchoring10, since we would expect 
similar results in Experiment 2 if this were the case. 
It seems the presence of the impure good actually plays a role in the decisions, even when 
it is inefficient. However its role is asymmetric since it becomes relevant when it favours 
the individual but irrelevant when the charitable component is more important. We see 
that when a selfish impure good is present, either neutral or inefficient, it is chosen by 
some individuals. Even when the impure good is not chosen, the amount donated to the 
charity is lower in comparison with the decisions where it was not present. 
Green goods are becoming increasingly available in markets for private goods. When the 
technology is efficient, their presence actually expands the choice set of individuals and 
may have a positive effect on the private provision of environmental public 
characteristics in equilibrium. However, in reality not all green good technologies are 
more efficient than the simple combination of consumption of private goods and 
donations to charity, and yet consumers still demand green goods. Therefore, despite the 
appeal that green and ethical goods may have for a decentralized private provision of 
public goods, we wonder if impure goods foster or discourage pro-environmental or pro-
social behaviours.  
As our experiment reveals, the introduction of a selfish impure good, either neutral or 
inefficient, is behaviourally relevant, not only because it alters median behaviours, but 
also because the impure good is chosen despite its inefficiency or neutrality. In sum, for a 
non-negligible part of the sample their pro-social behaviours in the presence of the 
impure goods are not consistent with pro-social motivations as normally interpreted, for 
example assuming altruistic motivations. From a theoretical point of view if individuals 
are assumed to have pro-social motivations and derive utility from a public good, they 
                                                 
10 Anchoring may still be driving the results in Experiment 1 since we cannot be sure how individuals are 
being influenced by the cue implied by the impure public good allocation. However, individuals 
only seem to be influenced by an eventual anchor when it is in their self-interest to do so, so if we 
assume anchoring is not self-serving, it should be present in both Experiments. 
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should care about the level of the public good regardless of whether it is achieved via a 
donation to a charitable cause or via an impure good. However, in our experiment some 
individuals decrease their donations, choose inefficient and selfish options, despite the 
private and public characteristics being transparent in all decisions. Thus individuals 
appear to care about more than the two characteristics. 
Authors such as Lazear et al, 2005, Dana et al., 2006 and Dana et al., 2007 have recently 
hypothesized that part of the altruistic behaviour previously observed in economic 
experiments may in fact be some sort of reluctant altruism, i.e. were these individuals to 
be given the possibility to “get away” with not being altruistic they would seize it. Given 
the conclusions of our experiment, the selfish impure good seems to be acting as an 
option to opt-out of the dictator game or providing leeway for a motivated reasoning 
process by which individual choose to behave less altruistically than in the absence of the 
impure good. Therefore in the absence of these impure goods, choices are transparent and 
there is no room to wriggle, so individuals who acknowledge an altruistic norm are more 
generous. Introducing a selfish impure good provides wriggle room and decreases pro-
social behaviours. In the case of green goods, though their emergence appears appealing 
for the private provision of environmental public goods, they may ultimately decrease 
pro-environmental behaviours. 
 In summary, the results from our experiments add to the growing literature on contextual 
effects in experiments on pro-social behaviour, where altruistic behaviours become less 
prevalent than in previous experiments and more context-dependent. On the other hand, 
our experiments provide an approach to studying the impact of impure goods on pro-
social behaviours and by generating somewhat unexpected results create room for future 
explorations of this topic. 
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